

themater. Resoun surmounteth imaginacioun, and comprehendeth by universal lookinge the comune spece that is in the singular peces. But the eye of intelligence is here; for it surmounteth the envolvinge of the universitee, and looketh, over that, by pure subtilitee of thought, thilke same simple forme of man that is perdurably in the divyne thought. In whiche this oughte greetly to ben considered, that the heyeste strengthe to comprehend things enbraseth and contieneth the lowere strengthe; but the lowere strengthe ne aryseth nat in no manere to heyere strengthe. For wit ne may nothing comprehend out of matere, ne the imaginacioun ne loketh nat the universels peces, ne resoun taketh nat the simple forme so as intelligence taketh it; but intelligence, that looketh al above, when it hath comprehended the forme, it knoweth & demeth alle the things that ben under that forme. But she knoweth hem in thilke manere in the whiche it comprehendeth thilke same simple forme that ne may never ben known to none of that other; that is to seyn, to none of tho three forside things of the sowle. For it knoweth the universitee of resoun, & the figure of the imaginacioun, and the sensible material conceived by wit; ne it ne useth nat nor of resoun ne of imaginacioun ne of wit withouteforth; but it biholdeth alle things, so as I shal seye, by a strok of thought formely, withoute discours or collacioun. Certes resoun, when it looketh anything universel, it ne useth nat of imaginacioun, nor of witte, & algates yit it comprehendeth the things imaginabile and sensible; for resoun is she that diffiniseth the universel of hir consyete right thus: man is a resonable twofoted beest. And how so that this knowinge is universel, yet nis therno wight that ne woot wel that a man is a thing imaginabile and sensible; & this same considereth wel resoun; but that nis nat by imaginacioun nor by wit, but it looketh it by a resonable concepcioun. Also imaginacioun, albeit so that it taketh of wit the bigynnynges to seen and to formen the figures, algates, althogh that wit ne were nat present, yit it environeth and comprehendeth alle things sensible; nat by resoun sensible of deminge, but by resoun imaginatif. Seestow nat thanne that alle the things, in knowinge, usen more of hir facultee or of hir power than they doon of the facultee or power of things that ben yknowe? Ne that nis nat wrong; for so as every jugement is the dede or doinge of him that demeth, it bihoveth that every wight performe the werk and his entencioun, nat of foreine power, but of his propre power.

Metre IV.

Quondam porticus attulit.

IN the Porche, that is to seyn, a gate of the town of Athens, theras philosophes hadden en, thilke Porche broughte somtyme olde men, fulderhe in hir sentences, that is to seyn, philosophes that highten Stoiciens, that wenden that images and sensibilitees, that is to seyn, sensible imaginaciouns, or elles imaginaciouns of sensible things, weren empynted into sowles fro bodies withouteforth; as who seith, that thilke Stoiciens wenden that the sowle hadde benaked of itself, as a mirour or a clene parchemin, that alle figures mosten first comen fro things fro withouteforth into sowles, & ben empynted into sowles. **Text:** right as we ben wont somtyme, by a swifte pointel, to sicchen lettres empynted in the smoothnesse or in the pleynesse of the table of wax or in parchemin that ne hath no figure ne note in it. **Glose.** But now argueth Boece ayeins that opinioun, and seith thus: But yif the thyrvinge sowle ne unpleyeth nothing, that is to seyn, ne doth nothing, by his propre moevinges, but suffreth and lyth subgit to tho figures and to tho notes of bodies withouteforth, and yildeth images ydel and veyn in the manere of a mirour, whennes thryveth thanne or whennes comth thilke knowinge in our sowle, that discerneth & biholdeth alle things? And whennes is thilke strengthe that biholdeth the singular things; or whennes is the strengthe that devyde the things yknowe; & thilke strengthe that gadereth togidre the things devyde; and the strengthe that cheseth his entrechaunged wey; for somtyme it heveth up the heved, that is to seyn, that it heveth up the entencioun to right heyere things; & somtyme it descendeth into right lowe things. And when it retorneth into himself, it reprooveth & destroyeth the false things by the trowe things. Certes, this strengthe is cause more efficient, and mochel more mighty to seen & to knowe things, than thilke cause that suffreth and receiveth the notes and the figures impressed in maner of matere. Algates the passiou, that is to seyn, the suffraunce or the wit, in the quike body, goth biforn, excitinge and moevinge the strengthes of the thought. Right so as when that cleernesme smyteth the eyen & moeveth hem to seen, or right so as vois or soun hurteleth to the eres and commoveth hem to herkne, than is the strengthe of the thought ymoeved and excited, and clepeth forth, to semblable moevinges, the peces that it halt withinne itself; and addeth tho peces to the notes and to the

things withouteforth, and medleth the images of things withouteforth to tho formes yhidde withinne himself.

Prose V.

Quod si in corporibus sentiendis.

WHAT yif that in bodies to ben feled, that is to seyn, in the takinge of knowe- leching of bodily things, and albeit so that the qualitees of bodies, that ben objecte fro withouteforth, moeven & entalen the instruments of the wittes; and albeit so that the passiou of the body, that is to seyn, the wit or the suffraunce, goth to form the strengthe of the workinge corage, the which passiou or suffraunce clepeth forth the dede of the thought in himself, and moeveth and exciteth in this manere whyle the formes that resten withouteforth; and yif that, in sensible bodies, as I have seyd, our corage nis nat ytaught or empynted by passiou to knowe these things, but demeth and knoweth, of his owne strengthe, the passiou or suffraunce subject to the body: moche more thanne tho things that ben absolut and quite fro alle talents or affeccions of bodies, as God or his aungeles, ne folwen nat in discerninge things objecte fro withouteforth, but they accomplisshen and speden the dede of hir thought. By this resoun thanne ther comen many maner knowinges to dyverse and differinge substaunces. For the wit of the body, the whiche wit is naked and despoiled of alle other knowinges, thilke wit comth to beestes that ne mowen nat moeven hemself her and ther, as oystres and muscules, and other swiche shellefish of the see, that clyven and ben norissched to roches. But the imaginacioun comth to remuable beestes, that semen to han talent to fleen or to desiren any thing. But resoun is alonly to the linage of mankinde, right as intelligence is only to the devyne nature: of which it folweth, that thilke knowinge is more worth than these othere, sin it knoweth by his propre nature nat only his subject, as who seith, it ne knoweth nat alonly that apertieneth properly to his knowinge, but it knoweth the subjects of alle other knowinges. But how shal it thanne be, yif that wit and imaginacioun stryven ayein resoninge, & seyn, that of thilke universel thing that resoun weneth to seen, that it nis right naught? For wit & imaginacioun seyn that that, that is sensible or imaginabile, it ne may nat be universel. Thanne is either the jugement of resoun sooth, ne that ther nis nothing sensible; or elles, for

that resoun wot wel that many things ben subject to wit and to imaginacioun, thanne is the concepcioun of resoun veyn & false, which that loketh & comprehendeth that that is sensible and singular as universel. And yif that resoun wolde answeren ayein to these two, that is to seyn, to witte & to imaginacioun, and seyn, that soothly she herself, that is to seyn, resoun, loketh and comprehendeth, by resoun of universalitee, bothe that that is sensible & that that is imaginable; and that thilke two, that is to seyn, wit and imaginacioun, ne mowen nat strecchen ne enhansen hemself to the knowinge of universalitee, for that the knowinge of hem ne may exceeden ne surmounte the bodily figures: certes, of the knowinge of things, men oughten rather yeven credence to the more stedefast and to the more parfit jugement. In this maner stryvinge thanne, we that han strengthe of resoninge & of imagininge and of wit, that is to seyn, by resoun and by imaginacioun and by wit, we sholde rather preysse the cause of resoun; as who seith, than the cause of wit and of imaginacioun.

SEMBLABLE thing is it, that the resoun of mankinde ne weneth nat that the devyne intelligence biholdeth or knoweth things to comen, but right as the resoun of mankinde knoweth hem. For thou arguest and seyst thus: that yif it ne seme nat to men that some things han certein & necessarie bitydinges, they ne mowen nat ben wist biforn certainly to bityden. And thannen is therno prescience of thilke things; and yif we trowe that prescience be in these things, thanne is ther nothing that it ne bitydeth by necessitee. But certes, yif we mighten han the jugement of the devyne thought, as we ben parsoneres of resoun, right so as we han demed that it behoveth that imaginacioun and wit be binethe resoun, right so wolde we demen that it were rightful thing, that mannes resoun oughte to submitten itself and to ben binethe the devyne thought. For which, yif that we mowen, as who seith, that, yif that we mowen, I counseyle, that we enhance us into the heichte of thilke sovereyn intelligence; for ther shal resoun wel seen that, that it ne may nat biholden in itself. And certes that is this, in what maner the prescience of God seeth alle things certains and diffinissched, althogh they ne han no certein issues or bitydinges; ne this is non opinioun, but it is rather the simplicitee of the sovereyn science, that nis nat enclosed nor yshet within none boundes.